A compositional account of contrastive topic in terms of non-cooperativity

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Questions in Discourse, Amsterdam, December 16th 2013

Goal of this talk

Main goal: a compositional account of (1):

(1) Who had what for lunch?
   a. [John]$_{CT}$ had [the beans]$_{F}$.
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Main obstacle for a formal account

How should 'important' and 'open-ended' be formalized?

Outline

1. The final rise
   - Open-endedness = non-cooperativity
   - A compositional account
2. Generalizing to the internal rise
   - Local contexts
   - The compositional account
3. Some predictions

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1.1. The sentence-final rise

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(see my AC/Semdial talk, Wednesday afternoon)

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That damn John was at the party

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

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

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

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

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

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- In the second dimension:
  $\searrow :: \lambda p_{stt}.☺(\mathfrak{I}, p)$; and
  $\nearrow :: \lambda p_{stt}.☹(\mathfrak{I}, p)$

1.7. Derivation: The final rise

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

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

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

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

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

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

Outline

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- The local context is the compositionally computed *theme*.

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I extend the 3D system with a *theme* dimension (cf. Balogh, 2009)

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Finally:

- When invoked in *IP*, $\mathfrak{I}$ looks in the *global context*: $\mathfrak{Q}$.
- When invoked in *iP*, $\mathfrak{I}$ looks in the *local context*: the theme.

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$[[[\text{John}]_{*}]_{\nearrow}\ [\text{had}\ [\text{the beans}]_{*}]_{\searrow}]_{\searrow}$

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

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

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

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

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x have b

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Satisfied non-at-issue content:

$\lambda x.x$ have b

$\lambda x.\exists y.x$ have y

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

Outline

1. The final rise
   - Open-endedness = non-cooperativity
   - A compositional account
2. Generalizing to the internal rise
   - Local contexts
   - The compositional account
3. Some predictions

3.1. QUD vs. theme

(7) What did John have for lunch?
John↗ had the beans↘↘

- ☺($\exists y.j$ have y, j have b)
- ☹($\exists x \exists y.x$ have y, j have b)
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John↗ had the beans↘↘

- ☺($\exists y.j$ have y, j have b)
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Hence, (a) is non-standard on lists:

(9) a. ? John↗ had the beans↘↘. Sue↗ had the pasta↘↘...
b. John↘ had the beans↗↗. Sue↘ had the pasta↗↗...

3.2. Scope

Same as (8), but with inverse scope:

(10) Of John, Bill and Mary, who had what?

a. John↗ had the beans↘↘ (‘the beans’ > ‘John’)

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↛ the same three guards.

3.3. 'Fall-rise'

An indirect answer:

(13) Was it raining?

a. John↗ had an umbrella↘↘

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Under a plausible account of negation, we get:

(14) a. [[[All]$_*$ my friends]$_\searrow$ didn't come.]$_\nearrow$ (‘not’ > ‘all’)

- ☺$(?\forall x.Cx, \neg\forall x.Cx)$
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Hence, fall-rise can disambiguate. (cf. Constant, 2012)

3.4. ‘D-trees’? ‘Strategies’?

(15) What did the stars wear?

a. # The female stars wore $[\text{caftans}]_{*} \searrow \searrow$

b. The $[\text{female}]_{*}$ stars$\nearrow$ wore $[\text{caftans}]_{*} \searrow \searrow$

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- (Pitch accents reveal only what the speaker finds *important*)

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(18) So anyway, John ate the beans.
John↗ ate the beans↗↗.

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(17) Who ate what?

a. John↘ ate the beans↗↗. ⇝ *not sure*

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- A very minimal discourse context: $\mathfrak{Q}$.
- No 'D-trees', 'strategies'. (a mapping is work in progress)

Thank you!

Papers (see staff.science.uva.nl/~westera/)

- *Exhaustivity through the Maxim of Relation* (*LENLS* proceedings)
- *'Attention, I'm violating a maxim!'* (*SemDial* proceedings; talk on Wednesday)

Thanks to the *Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research* (NWO) for financial support; to F. Roelofsen, J. Groenendijk for valuable comments.

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> "*[the epistemic] step does not follow from Gricean maxims and logic alone.*" - Chierchia, *et al.* (2008)

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What about a context negating only the competence *assumption*?

Against the competence *assumption*

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(speaker says '*John*' because she doesn't consider '*Mary*' possible.)

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